Under semantic monism, I understand the thesis “The Good is said in one way” and under semantic pluralism, the antithesis “The Good is said in many ways”. Plato’s Socrates seems to defend a “semantic monism”. As only one sun exists, so the “Good” has for Socrates and Plato only one reference. Nevertheless, Socrates defends in the Philebus a semantic pluralism, more exactly trialism, of “beauty, symmetry and truth” (Phlb.65a2). Therefore, metaphorically speaking, there seem to exist not only one sun, but three suns. If the platonic Socrates defends a semantic monism on the one hand and pluralism on the other, how can we unite his pluralism with his monism?\ud\udMy thesis is that the three references are “qualities” (poia) (cf. Ep. VII.343b8-c2) of the one single reference, or again, speaking metaphorically, “side suns” (Nebensonnen) of the single sun. For this I propose an exegesis of Plato’s last written word on the Good in Phlb.65a1-5 by dividing it into five sentences.\ud\udSecond, I ask a philosophical question on this monism and the corresponding hierarchy of values (Phil. 66 a 6-c 6).
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机译：在语义一元论下，我理解“以一种方式说善”的论点，在语义多元论下，我理解“以多种方式说善的”对立论。柏拉图的苏格拉底似乎捍卫了“语义一元论”。由于只有一个太阳，所以“好”对苏格拉底和柏拉图来说只有一个参考。尽管如此，苏格拉底在Philebus中捍卫了“美，对称和真”的语义多元性，更确切地说是三元论（Phlb.65a2）。因此，从隐喻上讲，似乎不仅存在一个太阳，而且存在三个太阳。如果柏拉图式的苏格拉底一方面捍卫语义一元论，另一方面捍卫多元论，那么我们如何将他的多元论与他的一元论结合起来呢？\ ud \ ud我的论点是，这三个参考是“品质”（poia）（参见Ep。 VII.343b8-c2），或者隐喻地说，是单个太阳的“侧面太阳”（Nebensonnen）。为此，我提出了柏拉图在65a1-5中关于商品的最后一个书面词的释义，将其分为五个句子。\ ud \ ud其次，我提出了关于这种一元论和相应的价值体系的哲学问题（菲尔书第66章） 6-c 6）。
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