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Open-door or closed-door? Transparency in domestic and international bargaining

机译:开门还是闭门?透明的国内和国际谈判

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摘要

In recent years there have been numerous calls for making the operations of international organizations more “transparent”. One element in these demands involves the idea that international negotiations should be open to the same level of outside scrutiny that is presumed to prevail with bargaining in domestic contexts. While transparency of this sort may have clear benefits by facilitating attempts to hold officials accountable, scholars have made less effort to consider whether making international bargaining more public might also have detrimental effects. I develop a game-theoretic model that provides four hypotheses about the relative benefits of open-door versus closed-door bargaining, and about the preferences of different actors with regard to this type of transparency. This model, which can be applied to both international and domestic contexts, helps extend positive theories about the design of institutions while also providing insights for the normative question of when transparency is desirable. I show that the hypotheses developed are supported both by historical evidence from eighteenth century disputes about publicity in national parliaments, and by evidence from the more recent dispute about making European Council of Ministers deliberations public.
机译:近年来,有许多呼吁使国际组织的运作更加“透明”。这些要求中的一个要素涉及这样一种想法,即国际谈判应在外部谈判的水平上公开进行,这种水平被认为在国内情况下的讨价还价中普遍存在。虽然这种透明性可以通过促进对官员负责的尝试而获得明显的好处,但学者们却很少考虑使国际谈判更加公开是否也会产生不利影响。我开发了一个博弈论模型,该模型提供了四个假设,这些假设涉及开放式交易与封闭式交易的相对利益,以及不同参与者在这种类型的透明度方面的偏好。该模型可以应用于国际和国内环境,有助于扩展有关机构设计的积极理论,同时也为何时需要透明性的规范性问题提供见解。我表明,所提出的假设得到了18世纪有关国民议会公开辩论的历史证据,以及最近关于使欧洲部长会议审议公开的争议的证据的支持。

著录项

  • 作者

    Stasavage David;

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  • 年度 2004
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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 {"code":"en","name":"English","id":9}
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