International financial governance, the EU, and Brexit: the ‘agencification’ of EU financial governance and the implications

摘要

This article argues that the forces which shape how the EU engages with international financial governance are changing and that the implications for the EU’s ability to impose its preferences internationally are significant. It suggests that this change is being driven by two related factors. First, the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), with their distinct incentives, preferences, and powers, have recently come to prominence in international financial governance. Second, as international financial governance pivots from being preoccupied with standard-setting to becoming concerned with operational matters there is greater potential for influence to be exerted by administrative actors such as the ESAs. This article uses the European Securities and Markets Authority – which is the most active ESA internationally – as a case study for examining the implications of the availability of a technocratic administrative channel through which the EU can engage with international financial governance. It also offers some predictions as to the implications of the Brexit decision for the ESAs as international actors and for the UK’s interaction with international financial governance.