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>On the downs-thomson paradox in a self-financing two-tier queuing system
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On the downs-thomson paradox in a self-financing two-tier queuing system
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机译:自筹资金两层排队系统中的唐斯汤姆森悖论
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摘要
We model a two-tier queuing system with free and toll service options as two parallel M/M/1 servers. We solve for the welfare-maximizing toll service capacity and toll subject to the constraint that the toll service cover its costs. If the free and toll services are both used in equilibrium, a larger free-service capacity implies longer expected waiting time for the free service and lower welfare: an analogue to the Downs-Thomson paradox in transportation economics. The paradox is caused by the presence of scale economies in the toll service combined with the requirement that it be self-financing.
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机译:我们将具有免费和收费服务选项的两层排队系统建模为两个并行的M / M / 1服务器。我们解决了福利最大化的收费服务能力问题,并在收费服务能够覆盖其费用的约束下解决了收费问题。如果免费服务和收费服务都处于均衡状态,则更大的免费服务能力意味着更长的免费服务等待时间和更低的福利:这类似于交通经济学中的唐斯-汤姆森悖论。这种悖论是由收费服务中规模经济的存在以及其自筹资金的要求引起的。
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