The Iraq War and the Post Vietnam Narrative: Culture and Change in the U.S. Army, 2005-2007

摘要

The Iraq War was an era of crisis and change within the U.S. Army. The failure ofthe army to adapt to the war revealed the obsolescence of post Vietnam army culture.Innovation experiences in the war were directionless and a new intellectual framework wasrequired to deal with warfare that the army had long disliked: counterinsurgency. Majororganizational change was accomplished by a coalition of generals led by Generals DavidPetraeus, Jack Keane, and Ray Odierno. These officers established a new intellectualframework with FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. They challenged institutional militaryorthodoxy in Washington by proposing a renewed commitment to victory. Finally, theydemonstrated the efficacy of counterinsurgency theory through a military campaign that“proved” FM 3-24. This major, yet limited, change in service culture fractured theconsensus of the post Vietnam narrative and initiated an ongoing reinterpretation of thearmy’s philosophy of war.