The effects-based approach to operations and the future of Army doctrine

摘要

This thesis addresses the implications of the Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) concept on U.S. Army doctrine. EBAO has the potential to radically change the Joint concept of warfare if one considers it as a more holistic approach to planning and conducting operations. Despite the Army's resistance to apply EBAO below the Corps level, numerous case studies from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) exist to prove otherwise and demonstrate how EBAO can be integrated into Army doctrine. This thesis begins by reviewing the evolution of EBAO from its inception during Desert Storm through Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02) to its present form. Next, it compares Army doctrine to the current EBAO concept and identifies potential shortfalls and conflicts between the two. By addressing the major shortfalls or conflicts, this thesis answers the question of whether or not EBAO has a role in future Army doctrine. Finally, recommendations are made in the form of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) as to how EBAO should be implemented into Army doctrine and what the implications of this application would be to the Army organization.