The Special Relationship and the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis, 1950–4

摘要

The Anglo-Iranian oil crisis of 1950–4 provides an ideal case-study for thoseudinterested in the postwar Anglo-American Special Relationship. This article investigates theudoil crisis with two purposes in mind: first, to demonstrate how Britain and the United Statesudstruggled to adjust their bilateral relations in response to their changing postwar worldudpositions; second, to show just how crucial both countries perceived the Special Relationshipudto be in the early 1950s. This is done by examining the American decision not to pursue audpolicy in the Iranian oil crisis that would undermine Britain’s position, despite at times severeudAnglo-American tension. It is concluded that the problems created by the changing balance ofudforces within the Special Relationship were mitigated in Iran by a combination ofudconsanguinity and, more important, the US need for British help in its policy of globaludcontainment. In short, Anglo-American policy-makers perceived sufficient mutual need toudpersuade them to actively preserve and develop the Special Relationship.