This paper argues that shadow directors, as defined in English law, ought to owe the full range of directors’ duties, both fiduciary and non-fiduciary, enacted in the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), ss 171-177, to the relevant company under their influence. Following the enactment of the recent Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act (SBEEA) 2015, these general duties are likely to apply to shadow directors, although there is still a case to be made as to why shadow directors should owe fiduciary duties to the relevant company. It is argued here that such a relationship is fiduciary in nature, but the current approach deployed in the English courts, based upon the application of Finn’s originally formulated ‘undertaking’ test alone, is inadequate. ududGiven these inadequacies, it is proposed that the Canadian ‘power and discretion’ test be deployed alongside the ‘undertaking’ test, in order to provide a far more comprehensive justification for the application of fiduciary obligations to shadow directors. This position is supported by establishing a theoretical basis for the ‘power and discretion’ test, via Paul Miller’s ‘fiduciary powers theory’, as well as considering the application of such a test to shadow directors.
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机译：本文认为，根据英国法律的定义，影子董事应将《 2006年公司法》（CA 2006）第171-177条所规定的全部董事职责（包括信托和非信托）归于相关公司在他们的影响下。在最近的2015年《小企业，企业和就业法》（SBEEA）颁布之后，这些一般职责很可能适用于影子董事，尽管尚有理由说明影子董事为何应负相关责任公司。这里有人争辩说，这样的关系本质上是信托的，但是基于芬恩最初制定的“接受”测试的应用，目前在英国法院采用的方法是不够的。 ud ud鉴于这些不足之处，建议将加拿大的“权力和酌处权”测试与“承诺”测试同时部署，以便为对影子导演实施信托义务提供更为全面的理由。借助保罗·米勒（Paul Miller）的“受信权理论”为“权力和自由裁量权”测试建立理论基础，并考虑将这种测试应用于影子导演，可以支持这一立场。
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