Market Power and the European Tuna Oligopsony: Implications for Fisheries and Trade

摘要

Some recent studies have shown the outstanding price linkages at the global scale between the cannery-gradeudtuna markets over the last decade. When it comes to price transmission along the European value chains, opposite results between the two major species (skipjack and yellowfin) are found: the market for final goods is actually segmented between the northern European countries consuming low-priced skipjack imported from Asia and the southern countries producing and importing yellowfin sold on their domestic markets at higher prices. If the former market is supposedly competitive, there is more suspicion of market power exercised on the latter. Through a structural and dynamic I.O. model already tested for other species in previous research, this paper explores the possible existence of market power exercised either by processors on the one hand (canned tuna sold in France) and/or by retailers on the other (French supermarkets). Some explanations are given in terms of industrial concentration for both processing and retailing industries and the marketing organisation itself. The high level of trade barriers protecting the European industry may also serve as a determining factor.