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The political economy of rationing health care in England and the US: the ‘accidental logics’ of political settlements

机译:英格兰和美国配给医疗保健的政治经济学:政治解决的“偶然逻辑”

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摘要

This article considers how the 'accidental logics' of political settlements for the English National Health Service (NHS) and the Medicare and Medicaid programmes in the United States have resulted in different institutional arrangements and different implicit social contracts for rationing, which we define to be the denial of health care that is beneficial but is deemed to be too costly. This article argues that rationing is designed into the English NHS and designed out of US Medicare; and compares rationing for the elderly in the United States and in England for acute care, care at the end of life, and chronic care.
机译:本文考虑了英国国家卫生局(NHS)以及美国的Medicare和Medicaid计划的政治解决的“偶然逻辑”如何导致不同的制度安排以及不同的定量配给隐性社会契约,我们将其定义为拒绝保健是有益的,但被认为代价太高。本文认为,配给是根据英国国民保健服务(NHS)设计的,是根据美国医疗保险(US Medicare)设计的;并比较了美国和英国的老年人定量配给,这些配给包括急性护理,临终护理和长期护理。

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