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Signaling in Secret: Pay-for-Performance and the Incentive and Sorting Effects of Pay Secrecy

机译:秘密发出信号:按绩效付费以及薪酬保密的激励和排序效应

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摘要

Key Findings: Pay secrecy adversely impacts individual task performance because it weakens the perception that an increase in performance will be accompanied by increase in pay; Pay secrecy is associated with a decrease in employee performance and retention in pay-for-performance systems, which measure performance using relative (i.e., peer-ranked) criteria rather than an absolute scale (see Figure 2 on page 5); High performing employees tend to be most sensitive to negative pay-for- performance perceptions; There are many signals embedded within HR policies and practices, which can influence employees’ perception of workplace uncertainty/inequity and impact their performance and turnover intentions; and When pay transparency is impractical, organizations may benefit from introducing partial pay openness to mitigate these effects on employee performance and retention.
机译:主要发现:薪酬保密对个人任务绩效产生不利影响,因为它减弱了人们对绩效提高将伴随薪酬增长的看法;薪酬保密与员工绩效的下降和绩效绩效系统中的保留率有关,绩效体系是使用相对(即同行排名)标准而不是绝对规模​​来衡量绩效的(参见第5页的图2);高绩效的员工往往对负面的绩效绩效观念最为敏感。人力资源政策和实践中嵌入了许多信号,这些信号可能会影响员工对工作场所不确定性/不公平的看法,并影响他们的绩效和离职意图;当薪酬透明度不切实际时,企业可以通过引入部分薪酬开放来减轻这些对员工绩效和保留率的影响,从而从中受益。

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