Unlike what Hobbesian theories argue, the provision of governance is not necessarily undermined by alack of statehood. Empirical findings show that – contrary to many voices in current debates on weak,failing, or failed states – various (non-state) actors provide governance even when statehood is limited.This paper addresses the puzzle of how to account for cases where governance exists although the statecannot or does not provide it. Transferring insights from political sociology to the analysis of such “governancewithout the state,” the paper holds that the way societies manage their affairs critically dependson social conditions, which are captured here following social capital theory. Working toward a politicalsociology of “governance without a state,” this paper links social capital, resulting in interpersonal trust, tosocial coordination underlying the provision of governance. In this context, governance is interpreted asa collective action game (“governance game”), in which socially embedded (collective) actors are seen asplayers whose behavior (in particular their decisions to cooperate) depends critically on their social capitalendowments. The main argument is that specific types of social capital endowments facilitate – and, thus,explain – specific modes of social coordination in areas of limited statehood. Explorative in nature, conceptualand theoretical arguments will be developed that offer new perspectives to explain the variance andmechanisms of governance outside the OECD world.
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