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The Effects of Negative Incidents in Sustainability Reporting on Investors' Judgments-an Experimental Study of Third-party Versus Self-disclosure in the Realm of Sustainable Development

机译:可持续发展报告中的负面事件对投资者判断的影响—可持续发展领域第三方与自我披露的实验研究

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摘要

This study examines how the disclosure of negative sustainability-related incidents affects the investment-related judgments of decision-makers. Participants in a sequential 2?×?2 between-subjects experiment first received a company's financial information before viewing additional sustainability information (by the company and by a non-governmental organization (NGO); with and without negative disclosure). Results indicate that self-reporting of negative incidents does not affect decision-makers’ stock price estimates and investment decisions compared with judgments based on financial information only. However, third-party disclosure of these incidents by a NGO has a negative affect on these investment-related judgments. Furthermore, the magnitude of the NGO reporting effect depends on whether the company itself simultaneously reports these incidents. Thus, disclosing negative incidents in sustainability reporting could lose some of its apparent stigma. Instead of avoiding negative reporting altogether, managers might use it as a risk mitigation tool in their reporting strategy. The results also emphasize the power of the often-mentioned ‘watchdog’ function of NGOs acting as stakeholder advocates.
机译:这项研究探讨了负面的可持续发展相关事件的披露如何影响决策者与投资相关的判断。参加顺序为2××2的受试者间实验的参与者在查看其他可持续性信息之前(由公司和非政府组织(NGO)进行;有或没有负面披露),首先会获得公司的财务信息。结果表明,与仅基于财务信息的判断相比,负面事件的自我报告不会影响决策者的股价估计和投资决策。但是,非政府组织通过第三方披露这些事件会对这些与投资有关的判断产生负面影响。此外,非政府组织报告效果的大小取决于公司本身是否同时报告这些事件。因此,在可持续发展报告中披露负面事件可能会失去一些明显的污名。经理们可能不会完全避免负面报告,而是将其用作报告策略中的风险缓解工具。结果还强调了非政府组织作为利益相关者倡导者经常提到的“看门狗”功能的力量。

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    Reimsbach D.; Hahn R.;

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  • 年度 2015
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