Mitigating sandwich attacks against a secure key management scheme in wireless sensor networks for PCS/SCADA

摘要

Alzaid et al. proposed a forward & backward secure key management scheme in wireless sensorudnetworks for Process Control Systems (PCSs) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)udsystems. The scheme, however, is still vulnerable to an attack called the sandwich attack that can beudlaunched when the adversary captures two sensor nodes at times t1 and t2, and then reveals all theudgroup keys used between times t1 and t2. In this paper, a fix to the scheme is proposed in order to limitudthe vulnerable time duration to an arbitrarily chosen time span while keeping the forward and backwardudsecrecy of the scheme untouched. Then, the performance analysis for our proposal, Alzaid et al.’s scheme,udand Nilsson et al.’s scheme is given.