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A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation

机译:同步岛微电网运行的网络物理安全性分析

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摘要

Cyber-security research in the field of smart grids is often performed with a focus on either the power and control domain or the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) domain. The characteristics of the power equipment or ICT domain are commonly not collectively considered. This work provides an analysis of the physical effects of cyber-attacks on microgrids – a smart grid construct that allows continued power supply when disconnected from a main grid. Different types of microgrid operations are explained (connected, islanded and synchronous-islanding) and potential cyber-attacks and their physical effects are analyzed. A testbed that is based on physical power and ICT equipment is presented to validate the results in both the physical and ICT domain.
机译:智能电网领域的网络安全研究通常侧重于电源和控制领域或信息与通信技术(ICT)领域。电力设备或ICT域的特性通常不会被共同考虑。这项工作分析了网络攻击对微电网的物理影响,微电网是一种智能电网结构,可以在与主电网断开连接时继续供电。解释了不同类型的微电网运营(连接,孤岛和同步岛),并分析了潜在的网络攻击及其物理影响。提出了一个基于物理功率和ICT设备的测试平台,以验证物理和ICT领域的结果。

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