Fenomenología, sentimientos e identidad. La contribución de la fenomenología husserliana de los sentimientos a la cuestión de la identidad personal

摘要

This paper deals, from the point of view of Husserlian Phenomenology, with the topic of the contribution of feelings to build and to reveal personal identity. The starting point is a brief description of what Husserl understood by “feelings”. The founder of the phenomenological movement considered that it was wrong to think that the sphere of feelings or affective experiences was homogenous. On the contrary, it is crossed by an important distinction namely the distinction between affective sensations (non intentional) and affective acts (intentional). Some unpublished Husserl’s manuscripts develop this analysis and go deep in the different kinds of affective intentionality. Once one I have presented a general view of the sphere of feelings, I consider the contribution of these experiences to the “conformation” and “manifestation” of the different personal identity’s levels. So one tries to offer a sort of “archeology” of personal identity starting with what Husserl called “lebendige Gegenwart” to what we call “personal identity in pregnant sense”.