À l'épreuve des faits... Bilan théorique des politiques macroéconomiques mises en œuvre en Russie

摘要

Mainstream economists have formulated many norms and prescriptions that, to a large extent, were carried over into the economic policies applied by Russian governments from 1992 till the August 1998 crash. But contrary to what is often pretended nowadays, there was never a consensus about these recommendations; and many academics even criticized them. By placing these norms and prescriptions in the context of Russia's recent economic history, we easily distinguish between what was predicted but did not occur and what occurred without having been predicted. This exposes standard economic theory's theoretical and methodological shortcomings. This theory has proven incapable of producing a both realistic and logically coherent conception of money. Its microeconomic assumptions either run counter to the facts or have no theoretical grounds. Last but not least, the explicit or implicit methodology it uses cannot meet up to scientific standards. The Russian economy's recession reveals a deep, far-reaching crisis in standard economic theory and its methodology. It also shows the need for stricter scientific criteria in applied economics. Happenings since the crash have delivered further proof: the expected hyperinflation never materialized, and the experts who had loudly proclaimed the merits of a Currency Board just were wrong.