Fonctionnement, transformation et tensions du système de brevet : les implications du « cours pro-brevet » à la lumière des études empiriques récentes

摘要

The paper aims to assess the effects of the new deal concerning the patent regime - the so-called pro-patent era - characterized by the reinforcement of the protection offered to the inventor and a new regulation of the « markets for knowledge ». We survey very recent empirical studies dealing mainly with the US and Japanese contexts. They show that the reinforcement has not boosted a growth of RandD expenditures as it is expected from the predictions of the standard Economics of patent. Stronger patents do not induce more innovation. We observe new patent behaviour based on a new role of patenting ; the firms patent to put pressure or rivals ot to block the behaviour of their rivals. The firms use patent in negociations over technology rights. The effects of the famous Bayh-Dole acts are also questionneld. Finally new tensions appear : it could be the firms accumulate more patents than what is socially optimal. A policy patent oriented towards more information diffusion will able to in some circumstances be preferable to a system of patent which blocks disclosure.