The paper sets up a four-stage enforcement model of fish quotas. The purpose of the paper is to show how the level of enforcement set by the authorities affects the way fishermen form coalitions. We show that a high level of control effort yields less co-operation among fishermen, while in the case of low control effort, coalitions are somewhat self-enforcing. The paper further discusses how the optimal enforcement level changes when the coalition formation among authorities changes: centralised, partly centralised and decentralised authorities. We show that decentralised authorities set a lower level of control effort compared to the centralised authorities. The theoretical results are illustrated by simulations of the Baltic Sea cod fishery. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006
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机译：本文建立了四个阶段的鱼类配额执行模型。本文的目的是说明当局设定的执法水平如何影响渔民组成联盟的方式。我们表明，高水平的控制努力会导致渔民之间的合作减少，而在低控制力的情况下，联盟在某种程度上是自我执行的。本文进一步讨论了当权力机构之间的联合组织发生变化时，最佳执法水平如何变化：集中，部分集中和分散的权力。我们显示，与集中式机构相比，分散式机构设置的控制工作级别较低。通过对波罗的海鳕鱼渔业的模拟说明了理论结果。版权所有Springer Science + Business Media，Inc. 2006
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