We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally, between exporting countries. We show that the equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive upstream industry may benefit an exporting (upstream) country and harm an importing (downstream) country. On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm exporting countries. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
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机译：我们研究了垂直链接行业中进出口国之间的政策博弈。在连续的国际古诺特寡头垄断中，我们分析了在战略上使用税收手段在出口国和进口国之间垂直转移租金，在出口国之间水平转移租金的动机。我们表明，均衡结果关键取决于行业上游和下游部分的相对竞争程度。在国民福利方面，更具竞争力的上游产业可能使出口国（上游）受益，而损害进口国（下游）。另一方面，更具竞争力的下游产业可能损害出口国。版权所有Springer Science + Business Media，LLC 2007
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