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Pay Enough, Don't Pay Too Much or Don't Pay at All? The Impact of Bonus Intensity on Job Satisfaction

机译:付够钱,不付太多钱还是根本不付钱?奖金强度对工作满意度的影响

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摘要

This paper attempts to examine the effect of the intensity of financial incentives (i.e. the proportion of workers' salary that is tied to bonuses) on job satisfaction. Understanding the influence of monetary incentives on job satisfaction is important given that the composition of an employee's remuneration package is an integral element of his/her overall working conditions. According to the standard microeconomic paradigm, in long-run equilibrium one would not expect to observe any differences in the marginal utilities of comparable workers under fixed or variable payment schemes. This should hold since the expected value of the higher wages paid under performance-related pay (PRP) should be just sufficient to compensate for the additional earnings risk and the disutility of extra effort. However, once the standard assumptions of the agency model are relaxed, and psychological arguments such as those of motivation crowding out theory ( Frey and Jegen, 2001 ) are taken into account, it is expected that PRP is likely to have a non-negligible impact on job satisfaction. To the extent that incentive schemes allow for optimization of effort, facilitate worker autonomy and enhance self-determination they should increase job satisfaction, other things equal. Yet increasing earnings risk, crowding out of the inherent pleasantness in performing one's job and lower morale can lead to disgruntled employees. Copyright � 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
机译:本文试图检验财务激励强度(即与工资挂钩的工人工资比例)对工作满意度的影响。鉴于员工薪酬待遇的构成是其整体工作条件的组成部分,因此了解货币激励措施对工作满意度的影响非常重要。根据标准的微观经济学范式,在长期均衡中,人们不会期望在固定或可变支付方案下,可比工人的边际效用有任何差异。这应该成立,因为与绩效挂钩的薪酬(PRP)下支付的较高工资的预期价值应足以补偿额外的收入风险和额外努力的无用功。但是,一旦放宽了代理模型的标准假设,并考虑了诸如动机挤出理论等心理学论点(Frey和Jegen,2001年),则预期PRP可能会产生不可忽略的影响工作满意度。在一定程度上,激励计划可以优化工作,促进工人的自主权和增强自决权,因此,在其他条件相同的情况下,他们应该提高工作满意度。然而,不断增加的盈利风险,排挤工作固有的愉悦感和士气低落会导致员工不满。版权所有�2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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    Konstantinos Pouliakas;

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  • 年度 2010
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