We consider a pollution permit market with a large firm and fringe of competitive firms. To smooth compliance towards a long-run emissions goal, firms are initially allocated a stock (i.e., bank) of permits that can be gradually consumed. We first show how the large firm can credibly manipulate the spot market in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Motivated by features observed in the US market for sulfur dioxide emissions, we then show that the introduction of stock transactions has no effects on market power, but that forward trading and incomplete observability of stock holdings do have pro-competitive effects. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006
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机译：我们考虑到一个污染许可证市场，该市场有大公司和竞争性公司。为了顺利实现长期排放目标，公司最初分配了可逐步消耗的许可证库存（即银行）。我们首先展示大公司如何在子博弈完美均衡中可靠地操纵现货市场。受美国市场观察到的二氧化硫排放特征的影响，我们然后表明，引入股票交易对市场支配力没有影响，但是远期交易和不完全的可观察性确实具有竞争优势。版权所有Springer Science + Business Media，Inc. 2006
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