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Defaulting firms and systemic risks in financial networks

机译:金融网络中的企业违约和系统性风险

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摘要

In this paper, we use the axioms introduced in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and Rogers and Veraart (2013) and study their consequences in terms of optimal sets of defaulting firms. We show that, from this point of view, the Absolute Priority axiom is not independent. We also show that the optimal sets of defaulting firms characterized in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) are still optimal when the Limited Payment axiom, implicit in Eisenberg and Noe (2001), is further removed. However, some other optimal sets of defaulting firms appear in this case. Finally, with the help of counterexamples, we show that no further weakening in the set of axioms considered can lead to positive results.
机译:在本文中,我们使用在Eisenberg和Noe(2001)以及Rogers和Veraart(2013)中引入的公理,并根据最优违约企业集研究它们的后果。从这个角度来看,我们证明了绝对优先公理不是独立的。我们还表明,当进一步删除Eisenberg和Noe(2001)中隐含的有限付款公理时,以Eisenberg和Noe(2001)为特征的违约公司的最优集合仍然是最优的。但是,在这种情况下,还会出现其他一些最佳的违约公司集。最后,借助反例,我们表明,所考虑的公理集中的任何进一步削弱都不会导致积极的结果。

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