Games of farmers – to cooperate or not?

摘要

Signs of the crisis of the Hungarian agriculture are in relation with the economic and social model that has udbecome rigid throughout the past two decades. The evolved structure of agricultural holdings the networks among udthe farmers have been restructured as well as have become losen. The degree of trust has decreased. Based on the udprinciples of the modern economic schools, e.g. the game theory, the study examines how the existing trust level udamong farmers affects the farmers’ preferences of choice among the different forms of dependencies, as well as which udfactors affect the individual utility functions, focused on the role of subsidies from the social transaction costs. Due udto the information asymmetry between farmers and the lack of confidence, the individual and the social expenditures udare higher than economically justifable. Based on a simulation model the paper examines the payoffs of the farms as udwell as the community from the point of view of machinery use and investment strategies.