In this paper, we investigate the problem of the strategic foundation of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium approach. To this end, we\udrespecify à la Cournot-Walras the mixed version of a model of simultaneous, noncooperative exchange, originally proposed by Lloyd S.\udShapley. We show, through an example, that the set of the Cournot-\udWalras equilibrium allocations of this respecifcation does not coincide\udwith the set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the mixed\udversion of the original Shapley's model. As the nonequivalence, in a\udone-stage setting, can be explained by the intrinsic two-stage nature of\udthe Cournot-Walras equilibrium concept, we are led to consider a further reformulation of the Shapley's model as a two-stage game, where\udthe atoms move in the first stage and the atomless sector moves in\udthe second stage. Our main result shows that the set of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium allocations coincides with a specific set of subgame\udperfect equilibrium allocations of this two-stage game, which we call\udthe set of the Pseudo-Markov perfect equilibrium allocations.
展开▼
