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Changing the bargain: The stability and change of centralized wage bargaining in open liberal economies

机译:改变讨价还价:开放自由经济体系中集中式工资讨价还价的稳定性和变化

摘要

The methodology used in the dissertation is a paired comparison of Ireland (?Social Partnership? 1987-2005) and Australia (?The Accord? 1983-1996), with reference to other cases of central wage bargaining in liberal economies. The primary research question is, what explains the stability of Irish central wage bargaining in comparison to the decentralization of wage bargaining experienced in Australia in the late 1980s and early 1990s?There are two conditions that must be sustained in order that central wage bargaining is stable in open liberal economies. First, public sector wages must be kept under strict control and large wage drift must be avoided. Second, export sector employers must be able to exercise pay flexibility. Pay flexibility is defined as encompassing an outcome dimension (exporters should be allowed to give pay increases above or below the centrally agreed wage bargain increase) and a process dimension (exporters should be allowed to set wages with a minimum of interference from third parties, be they wage setting institutions or trade unions).The two necessary conditions of public sector wage control and export sector pay flexibility are found in the Irish case explaining central wage bargaining stability, but not in the Australian case, explaining its wage bargaining decentralization. In Ireland after 1987, the stability of the system has been enabled by a concerted effort by policy-makers to de-couple pay movements between the public and export sectors. This is achieved through allowing export employers pay flexibility, while ending old patterns of public sector relativities-driven wage bargaining. This is in contrast to the late 1970s and early 1980s where large public sector wage drift caused the decentralization of wage bargaining. The Australian system decentralized because wage arbitration institutions created during a closed trade policy regime interfered with the process aspect of pay flexibility of exporters. These institutions intruded into wage setting at the plant level, and enhanced the power of trade unions to influence and alter the wage setting process. This provoked a successful export-employer led offensive on the central wage bargaining system.
机译:本文所采用的方法是爱尔兰(“ Social Partnership”(1987-2005)和澳大利亚(“ Accord”(1983-1996))与自由经济体中其他中央工资谈判案例的成对比较。主要的研究问题是,与1980年代末和1990年代初在澳大利亚经历的工资谈判分散化相比,是什么解释了爱尔兰中央工资谈判的稳定性?必须保持两个条件才能使中央工资谈判稳定在开放的自由经济国家。首先,必须严格控制公共部门的工资,避免大规模的工资变动。第二,出口部门的雇主必须能够行使薪酬灵活性。工资的灵活性定义为包括结果维度(应允许出口商在高于或低于中央商定的讨价还价的基础上增加工资)和过程维度(应允许出口商在最小程度上受到第三方干扰的情况下设定工资)。公共部门工资控制和出口部门支付灵活性的两个必要条件在爱尔兰的案例中找到,该案例解释了中央工资议价的稳定性,而在澳大利亚的案例中则没有,说明了其工资议价分权化。 1987年后的爱尔兰,政策制定者共同努力,使公共部门和出口部门之间的工资变动脱钩,从而使系统的稳定性得以实现。这可以通过允许出口雇主支付灵活性,同时结束公共部门相对性驱动的工资谈判的旧模式来实现。这与1970年代末和1980年代初的情况相反,在公共领域,大规模的工资波动导致工资谈判的权力下放。澳大利亚制度之所以下放权力,是因为在封闭的贸易政策体制下建立的工资仲裁机构干扰了出口商薪酬灵活性的过程。这些机构介入了工厂一级的工资设定,并增强了工会影响和改变工资设定过程的能力。这激起了成功的出口雇主领导的对中央工资谈判制度的攻势。

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    Jackson Stephen;

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  • 年度 2005
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