“Ethics With Ontology” both alludes to and contrasts with Hilary Putnam’s book Ethics Without Ontology (2004). In this book, Putnam proposes that there can be moral objectivity without objects, or moral truth without any descrip- tion of a moral realm. Since then, many others (for instance, T. Scanlon, R. Dworkin, C. Korsgaard, and D. Parfit have claimed that the view that there are moral truths has no ontological implications. They opt instead for a metaethical cognitivism without moral realism. On the other hand, one of the most striking developments in the metaethical debate of the past 15 years has been the renewal of nonnaturalist moral realism—the view which (at least in its so-called “robust” versions) presents the strongest ontological and metaphysical commitments, namely commitments to the existence of non-natural properties and facts.
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机译：“带有本体论的伦理学”既与希拉里·普特南（Hilary Putnam）的《没有本体论的伦理学》（Ethics Without Ontology）（2004）暗指并形成对照。普特南在这本书中提出，可以有没有对象的道德客观性，或者没有任何道德领域描述的道德真理。从那以后，许多其他人（例如T. Scanlon，R。Dworkin，C。Korsgaard和D. Parfit都声称存在道德真理的观点没有本体论含义，他们选择了没有道德现实主义的元伦理认知主义。另一方面，在过去的15年间，超民族主义辩论中最引人注目的发展之一就是非自然主义道德现实主义的更新-这种观点（至少在其所谓的“稳健”版本中）呈现出最强的本体论形而上的承诺，即对非自然属性和事实存在的承诺。
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