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Which Matters Most: Party Strategic Exit or Voter Strategic Voting? A Laboratory Experiment

机译:最重要的是:党的战略退出还是选民的战略投票?实验室实验

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摘要

There is abundant empirical evidence that the plurality rule constrains party competition and favors two-party systems. This reduction of party system fragmentation may be due to parties deciding not to enter elections for which they are not viable and/or voters voting strategically. Yet, no prior research has attempted to estimate the respective role of parties and voters in this process. To fill this gap, we conducted a unique laboratory experiment where some subjects played the role of parties and others played the role of voters, and where the two were able to respond to each other just as in real-life elections. We find that the reduction due to party strategic exit is higher than that due to strategic voting. We conclude that parties play a key role in the effect of the plurality rule on party system fragmentation.
机译:有大量的经验证据表明,多元化规则会限制政党竞争并有利于两党制。政党制度分裂的减少可能是由于政党决定不参加他们不可行的选举和/或选民进行战略性投票。然而,没有任何先前的研究试图估计政党和选民在这一过程中的各自作用。为了填补这一空白,我们进行了一项独特的实验室实验,其中一些主题扮演了政党的角色,另一些则扮演了选民的角色,并且两个角色能够像现实选举中那样相互回应。我们发现,由于政党战略退出而导致的减少要高于由于战略投票而引起的减少。我们得出结论,当事方在多元化规则对当事方体系分裂的影响中起着关键作用。

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