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New Rules for Health Care Procurement in the UK:A Critical Assessment from the Perspective of EU Economic Law

机译:英国卫生保健采购新规则:从欧盟经济法角度的批判性评估

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摘要

The recently adopted UK National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No. 2) Regulations 2013 include an interesting (and somehow unsettling) provision authorising anti-competitive behaviour in the commissioning of health care services by the National Health Service (NHS), if that is in the (best) interest of health care users. Generally, it seems that under the new public procurement and competition rules applicable to the NHS, whatever is considered in the “interest of patients” could trump pro-competitive requirements and allow the commissioning entity to engage in distortions of competition (either directly, or by facilitating anti-competitive behaviour by tenderers and service providers) — as long as a sort of qualitative cost-benefit analysis shows that net advantages derived from the anti-competitive procurement activity. The apparent oddity of such general “authorisation” for public buyers to engage in anti-competitive procurement of health care services deserves some careful analysis, which this paper carries out. The paper assesses Regulation 10 of the NHS Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition Regulations 2013 and the substantive guidance published by the UK's health care sector regulator (Monitor) from the perspective of EU economic law (and, more specifically, in connection to public procurement and competition rules). The paper claims that there is a prima facie potential incompatibility between Regulation 10 of the 2013 NHS Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition Regulations and both EU competition law and public procurement law — which are, in principle, opposed to any anti-competitive or competition restrictive behaviour in the conduct of public procurement activities. Consequently, there is a need for an EU law compliant, restrictive interpretation and enforcement of the provision — at least where there is a cross border effect on competition and/or a cross border interest in tendering for the health care contracts, which triggers the application of both EU competition law and public procurement law.
机译:最近通过的《 2013年英国国家卫生服务(采购,患者选择和竞争)(第2号)条例》中有一项有趣的规定(以某种方式令人不安),授权国家卫生服务局(NHS)在提供医疗服务时采取反竞争行为)(如果这符合医疗保健用户的(最大)利益)。通常,在适用于NHS的新公共采购和竞争规则看来,任何出于“患者利益”考虑的事情都可能胜过有利于竞争的要求,并允许委托实体进行竞争性的扭曲(直接或间接)。 (通过促进投标人和服务提供商的反竞争行为)—只要一种定性的成本效益分析表明,净收益来自反竞争采购活动。这种普遍的“授权”对于公共购买者进行反竞争性的医疗服务采购而言,显然是很奇怪的,值得对此进行一些仔细的分析。本文从欧盟经济法的角度(尤其是在公共采购和公共采购方面)评估了《 NHS采购,患者选择和竞争法规2013》第10条以及英国卫生保健部门监管机构(Monitor)发布的实质性指南。比赛规则)。该文件声称,2013年NHS采购法规10,患者选择和竞争法规与欧盟竞争法和公共采购法之间存在表面上潜在的不兼容,从原则上讲,这与任何反竞争或竞争性限制相抵触在进行公共采购活动中的行为。因此,至少在那些对竞争产生跨界影响和/或在医疗合同招标中存在跨界利益的情况下,需要对该条款进行欧盟法规的严格解释和执行。欧盟竞争法和公共采购法。

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    Sanchez Graells, Albert;

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  • 年度 2015
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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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