The present work is a systematic study of the nexus which holds together perception,udmotivation and existence in Husserl’s early writings—precisely those which are datedudbetween 1898 and 1921. In Chapter I a historical and conceptual reconstruction of theudgenesis of what is termed ‘constitution problem’ is provided. After a thorough discussionudabout the distinction between real and intentional description, we elucidate theudmethod of phenomenological reduction and show how the constitution problem relatesudto questions regarding transcendence and existence. Chapter II is concerned with auddetailed presentation of Husserlian phenomenology of visual perception. We presentudHusserl’s theory of intentionality in the light of Husserlian mereology: first, we argueudthat Husserl conceives of intentionality as a property which entails a relation; secondly,udwe debate his critique of the theory of immanent objects and his solution to theudproblem of non-existent objects. After examining the perceptual act in all its essentialudcomponents (i.e. quality, matter and sensations), we discuss the notorious ‘content –udapprehension’ schema and study the manuscripts in which Husserl develops the notionudof ‘perceptional’. Themes like the relationship between fulfillment and disappointmentudand the distinguishability of veridical and non-veridical perceptions are also taken intoudaccount. In Chapter III we consider what differentiates the outer perception fromudother kinds of perception. After making clear what Husserl means by ‘inner perception’udwe debate the opposition between immanent and transcendent perception, first byudusing identity/manifold analysis and then by means of whole/part analysis. In thisudcontext we reject Husserl’s account of reflection as a perceptual act on both exegeticaludand theoretical grounds. Furthermore, we explain how Husserl tries to refute theud‘image theory’ and how he addresses the issue of the hidden profiles. The study of theudmicrostructure of the outer perception allows us to explain in which sense this kind ofudperception is to be conceived as necessarily inadequate. Chapter IV is largely devotedudto an attempt at systematizing Husserl’s theory of kinaesthesia as it appears in theudDingvorlesung. This sheds light on the structure of motivation and on the role whichudthis latter plays in the constitution of a mundane object. In Chapter V we scrutinizeudHusserl’s conception of the possibility/reality dichotomy. In particular, we distinguishudan ontological analysis of possibility from a phenomenological one and investigate theuddiverse concepts of ‘possibility’ (e.g. ideal, real, independent, modal) developed byudHusserl. Finally, we introduce and debate Husserl’s (so-called) ‘exhibition principle’udand try to point out its ambiguities.
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