The deepening of the problem of evil in Nishitani Keiji

摘要

While Nishitani is well-known for his study of overcoming nihilism, the starting point of his thought was the problem of evil. Indeed, much of his early works were oriented towards this problem. Even as his main interest moves on to nihilism later on, the problem of evil remains as the basic idea for nihilism. The aim of this paper is to clarify Nishitani's criticism towards Kant's doctrine of radical evil by mainly focusing on his essay, "The Problem of Evil". Nishitani claims that morality cannot be penetrated in Kant's standpoint of practical reason (praktische Vernunft) due to the issue of pride (Superbia). He accordingly reinterprets some of Kant's technical terms such as imagination (Einblildungskraft), sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) and understanding (Verstand) in order to clarify the structure of the radical evil. Finally, he concludes that fundamental will is the nature of the radical evil. However, contrary to Nishitani's own view, imagination seems to play a more significant role as the ground of evil than fundamental will. Clarifying this idea will shed light on the development of Nishitani's thought from the problem of evil to nihilism.