Putting Lethal Force on the Table:udHow Drones Change the Alternative Space of War and Counterterrorism

摘要

Contrary to the prevailing view that drones spare civilian lives, this paperudargues that drones actually place more civilians at risk. The reason is simple:uddrones are used outside areas of active hostilities in civilian populated areas whereudno other weapon could be used. The oft-repeated mantra that drones are moreudprecise and less destructive and therefore spare more civilian lives rests on a falseudcomparison. Many commentators wrongly assume that if we were not usinguddrones, we would be using some less precise and more destructive alternative,udsuch as cruise missiles. Apart from the difficulties in deploying cruise missilesudcovertly and their inability to strike with drone accuracy, cruise missile strikes inudcivilian populated areas would almost certainly violate the laws of distinction andudproportionality and, even if technically legal, would be politically unpalatable.udDrones thus put lethal force on the table where it would otherwise be absent andudthey highlight the lack of law designed to regulate their use. Because the law ofudarmed conflict was developed for active war zones, it is inadequate to governuddrone strikes in areas away from active hostilities. As a result, the laws ofuddistinction and proportionality, which govern the use of lethal military force, mustudbe reformulated for drone strikes. Rather than focusing solely on theudcommander’s intent to target enemy combatants, distinction should require audfunctional analysis of the geographic area to be destroyed by a strike—the deathudzone. Where the death zone by its nature, location, purpose or use is substantiallyuda civilian object, such as an outdoor market or a civilian apartment building, theuddeath zone as a whole should be deemed a civilian object, regardless of theudpresence of an otherwise valid military objective, such as an enemy militant. Onceuda target satisfies distinction, our assessment of proportionality should take intoudaccount not only the civilian casualties likely to result from the strike, but also theudstrategic costs and negative secondary effects of deploying aerial strikes inudcivilian areas.