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Depiction of the Regulator-Regulated Entity Relationship in the Chemical Industry: Deterrence-Based vs. Cooperative Enforcement

机译:化工行业中监管者与实体之间关系的描述:基于威慑力与合作执法

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摘要

For years, scholars and environmental policymakers have conducted a spirited debate about the comparative merits of two different approaches to enforcement of the nationu27s environmental laws: the coercive (or deterrence-based) and cooperative approaches. Supporters of the coercive model regard the deterrence of violations as the fundamental purpose of enforcement. They regard the imposition of sanctions, which make it less costly for regulated entities to comply with their regulatory responsibilities and avoid enforcement than to fail to comply and run the risk of enforcement, as the most effective way for inducing regulated entities to comply with their regulatory obligations. Proponents of the cooperative approach to environmental enforcement focus more on compliance than deterrence. The cooperative approach emphasizes the provision of compliance assistance and incentives by regulatory agencies. They contend that a coercive approach to enforcement may even be counterproductive if it engenders intransigence and ill will on the part of regulated entities.Few studies empirically test these competing theories about how best to induce environmental compliance. Our study, which is based on a survey of chemical manufacturing facilities that are regulated under the federal Clean Water Act (u22CWAu22), represents an effort to begin addressing the paucity of information on the effects of the two enforcement approaches on environmental compliance and behavior. Although most of the respondents to our survey describe the relationships they have with their CWA regulators as generally either cooperative or coercive, they also report that some particular aspects of their relationships are more consistent with one enforcement approach, while other aspects are more consistent with the other enforcement approach. Our study calculates and interprets the correlations between all of the various aspects of the regulator-regulated entity relationship, especially the overall type of relationship: coercive versus cooperative. The results reveal only weak correlation between the various measures capturing the relationship between the regulator and the regulated entity. Cross-tabulation of the responses to all possible pairs of relationship aspects also reveals less than complete overlap between the various measures capturing the relationship between the regulator and the regulated entity. We conclude that the relationship between a regulator and a regulated entity consists of multiple dimensions. Environmental scholars and policymakers should recognize the nuanced nature of these relationships if they are to provide the most meaningful contributions to the ongoing debate over the impacts of coercive and cooperative enforcement approaches on the behavior and performance of regulated entities.
机译:多年来,学者和环境政策制定者就强制执行国家环境法律的两种不同方法的相对优点进行了激烈的辩论:强制性(或基于威慑)和合作性方法。强制性模式的支持者将威慑侵权行为视为执法的基本目的。他们认为制裁的实施是最有效的方法,诱使受监管实体遵守其监管规定,这使受监管实体履行其监管职责和避免执行成本比不遵守和冒执行风险要低。义务。支持环境执法的合作方式的支持者更多地关注合规性而非威慑力。合作方式强调监管机构提供合规援助和激励措施。他们认为,强制性执法如果导致被监管实体的顽固不化和恶意,甚至会适得其反。很少有研究对这些相互竞争的理论进行实验性测试,以探讨如何最好地诱导环境合规。我们的研究基于对受联邦《清洁水法》( u22CWA u22)监管的化学制造设施的调查,该研究表明,我们开始着手解决有关两种执法方法对环境合规性影响的信息匮乏的问题。和行为。尽管我们调查的大多数受访者都将他们与CWA监管机构之间的关系描述为合作或强制性关系,但他们还报告说,他们关系中的某些特定方面更符合一种执法方式,而其他方面则更符合一种强制执行方式。其他执法方式。我们的研究计算并解释了监管者与实体之间关系的各个方面之间的相关性,特别是关系的整体类型:强制性与合作性。结果显示,各种措施之间的弱关联反映了监管者与被监管实体之间的关系。对所有可能的关系对的响应的交叉表还显示,捕获监管者与被监管实体之间关系的各种措施之间的重叠程度还不完全。我们得出结论,监管者与被监管实体之间的关系包括多个维度。环境学者和决策者应该认识到这些关系的细微差别,如果它们能为正在进行的有关强制和合作执行方式对受监管实体的行为和绩效影响的辩论提供最有意义的贡献。

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