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Benchmarking and incentive regulation of quality of service: an application to the UK electricity distribution utilities

机译:服务质量的基准化和激励性监管:在英国配电事业中的应用

摘要

Quality of service has emerged as an important issue in post-reform regulation of electricity distribution networks. Regulators have employed partial incentive schemes to promote cost saving, investment efficiency, and service quality. This paper presents a quality-incorporated benchmarking study of the electricity distribution utilities in the UK between 1991/92 and 1998/99. We calculate technical efficiency of the utilities using Data Envelopment Analysis technique and productivity change over time using quality-incorporated Malmquist indices. We find that cost efficient firms do not necessarily exhibit high service quality and that efficiency scores of cost-only models do not show high correlation with those of quality-based models. The results also show that improvements in service quality have made a significant contribution to the sector�s total productivity change. In addition, we show that integrating quality of service in regulatory benchmarking is preferable to cost-only approaches.
机译:服务质量已成为配电网改革后监管中的重要问题。监管机构采用了部分激励计划,以促进成本节约,投资效率和服务质量。本文介绍了在1991/92年至1998/99年间英国电力公司的质量纳入基准研究。我们使用数据包络分析技术计算公用事业的技术效率,并使用质量合并的Malmquist指数计算生产率随时间的变化。我们发现,具有成本效益的公司并不一定表现出较高的服务质量,而仅成本模型的效率得分与基于质量的模型的效率得分并没有很高的相关性。结果还表明,服务质量的提高为该行业的总生产率变化做出了重大贡献。此外,我们表明,将服务质量整合到监管基准中比仅采用成本方法更为可取。

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