The Transport Board’s very significant and effective role in the preparation of all the major military expeditions and in the ultimate defeat of Bonaparte has been largely ignored by historians. The Board has hitherto been perceived as a subsidiary board of the Admiralty. However it was responsible to the Treasury and its main task was to transport and support the army overseas, on the instructions of the Secretary of State for War. The government depended upon the availability of merchant ships for this purpose. Yet less than 10 per cent of the registered merchant ships were suitable to be used as troop ships. At peaks of demand, in 1805, 1808 and 1814, the Transport Board chartered 30 to 39 per cent of this shipping. This had a significant impact international trade, on freight rates and the domestic price of commodities, particularly coal. There is strong evidence that between 1793 and 1805 government contracts sustained the British merchant shipping fleet by replacing the trade, previously conducted with European ports that were then controlled by the enemy. Without this support those ships would have been laid up.ududThe government’s requirement to reduce the costs of war generally encouraged early termination of transports’ contracts, rather than retaining them for the next big expedition. This occurred particularly between 1807 and 1809. That and the restricted use of naval vessels to convey troops hindered the speedy preparation of exceptionally large expeditions. The study suggests that some of the proposed expeditions were just too big to be managed effectively. Despite the Transport Board’s direct communications with the Secretary of State it was not consulted for advice during the planning of expeditions and consequently the impact of seasonality was ignored and preparation times underestimated. There were inevitably delays in the preparations of expeditions but this thesis demonstrates that the times taken to prepare for major expeditions was between 10 to 16 weeks, not excessive even by today’s standards.
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机译：历史学家在很大程度上忽视了运输委员会在所有主要军事远征的准备以及波拿巴的最终失败中的非常重要和有效的作用。迄今为止，该委员会是金钟的附属委员会。然而，它对财政部负责，其主要任务是按照战争大臣的指示，向海外运输和支持军队。政府为此目的依靠商船的供应。然而，不到10％的注册商船适合用作部队船。在需求高峰时，在1805年，1808年和1814年，运输委员会租用了30％至39％的这种运输。这对国际贸易，对运费和商品特别是煤炭的国内价格产生了重大影响。有充分的证据表明，在1793年和1805年之间，政府合同通过取代贸易来维持了英国商船船队，而贸易以前是由敌人控制的欧洲港口进行的。如果没有这种支持，这些船只将不得不被搁置。 ud ud政府降低战争成本的要求通常会鼓励运输合同的提前终止，而不是保留它们以进行下一次大探险。尤其是在1807年至1809年之间。这种情况以及海军舰船运送部队的受限阻碍了特大型探险队的迅速准备。该研究表明，一些拟议的探险活动规模太大，无法有效管理。尽管运输委员会与国务卿有直接联系，但在进行远征规划时并未征询其意见，因此，季节性的影响被忽略了，准备时间被低估了。探险的准备工作不可避免地会有延误，但是这篇论文表明，准备主要探险所花费的时间在10到16周之间，即使按今天的标准来看也不算多。
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