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Netscape is Dead: Remedy Lessons from the Microsoft Litigation

机译:Netscape已死:Microsoft诉讼中的补救措施

摘要

On March 1, 2008, AOL officially pulled the plug on the Netscape Browser, killing off the killer app of 1995 whose success had led Microsoft on an exclusionary campaign which eventually triggered the now-famous Microsoft monopolization litigation. Although the government plaintiffs in the United States were eventually successful on the merits in the monopolization litigation, Netscapeu27s death highlights the problem of remedy. Microsoft retains its monopoly position in the desktop PC operating system market; Microsoftu27s Internet Explorer browser still has nearly 75 percent of the browser market, despite the challenge from the technologically superior Firefox browser. The European Commissionu27s parallel case has fared no better. Microsoft was found to have abused its dominant position by tying its media player to Windows and by refusing to disclose necessary server-system interoperability information. But the Commissionu27s media player unbundling remedy failed completely and its interoperability order has not halted Microsoftu27s progress toward dominance in the work group server operating system market. In fact, in 2008, after imposing more than $2.3 billion in fines on Microsoft for the initial violations and Microsoftu27s failure to comply with the Commissionu27s remedy orders, the Commission announced that it was opening two new investigations into Microsoft, one of which involves the tying of Internet Explorer to Windows.This paper explores the problems of remedy in monopolization cases, using the Microsoft litigation as an exemplar. In the paper I argue that we have paid too little attention to remedy issues and that Microsoft teaches us at least three things about remedies: (1) Enforcers need to give more consideration to potential remedies prior to bringing monopolization cases. (2) Enforcers need to consider the full panoply of remedial options, including restructuring and fines. (3) Greater attention needs to be paid to evaluating remedies, including articulating goals and establishing benchmarks for measuring progress.The paper is in three parts. The first reviews the Microsoft litigation in the U.S. and EU, including private damages suits. The second reviews the remedies imposed in the U.S. and EU. The third focuses on the implications for the remedies debate, covering the political economy of remedies, remedial options, the craft of remedies, and multiple enforcement.
机译:2008年3月1日,AOL正式取消了Netscape Browser的插头,杀死了1995年的杀手级应用程序,该应用程序的成功使Microsoft进行了一场排他性竞选,最终引发了现在闻名的Microsoft垄断诉讼。尽管美国政府的原告最终在垄断诉讼中获得了成功,但Netscape的去世凸显了补救问题。微软在台式电脑操作系统市场上保持着垄断地位。尽管技术先进的Firefox浏览器带来了挑战,但Microsoft的Internet Explorer浏览器仍然占据了浏览器市场近75%的份额。欧盟委员会的平行案件并没有更好的表现。人们发现微软通过将其媒体播放器与Windows捆绑在一起,并拒绝透露必要的服务器系统互操作性信息,从而滥用了其主导地位。但是委员会的媒体播放器解捆绑解决方案完全失败,并且其互操作性命令并未阻止Microsoft在工作组服务器操作系统市场上取得统治地位的进展。实际上,在2008年,在对Microsoft最初的违规行为和Microsoft未能遵守委员会的救济命令处以超过23亿美元的罚款之后,委员会宣布将对Microsoft进行两项新的调查,其中一项是本文以Microsoft诉讼为例,探讨了垄断情况下的补救问题。在本文中,我认为我们对补救措施的关注太少了,并且Microsoft至少教会了我们有关补救措施的三件事:(1)执法人员在提出垄断案件之前需要更多地考虑潜在的补救措施。 (2)执法人员需要充分考虑补救措施,包括改组和罚款。 (3)需要更加重视评估补救措施,包括阐明目标和建立衡量进展的基准。本文分为三个部分。第一篇文章回顾了微软在美国和欧盟的诉讼,包括私人损害赔偿诉讼。第二部分回顾了美国和欧盟实施的补救措施。第三个重点是对补救措施辩论的影响,涵盖了补救措施的政治经济学,补救办法,补救措施和多重执法。

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