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Predicting public approval of Supreme Court nominees: examining factors influencing mass public opinion of stealth nominees in the post-Bork era

机译:预测最高法院被提名人的公众批准:研究后博克时代影响隐形被提名人大众舆论的因素

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摘要

Conventional wisdom asserts that the American public is ignorant of the Supreme Court and thus, the opinions of average citizens are irrelevant, both in the confirmation debates regarding nominees to the Supreme Court and as a tool of political mobilization. In light of the Seventeenth Amendment\u27s direct election of the Senate and the Senate\u27s advice and consent role, mass public opinion is relevant regardless of the sophistication of their input. Moreover, mobilization of mass public approval or disapproval of nominees is a factor influencing the strategies of partisan politics in general.It is clear that the public is aware of Supreme Court nominees and they evaluate the nominees on two different bases. First, the public evaluates nominees based on an ideological model to the extent of the information the public possesses about the ideology of nominees. Second, the public assesses nominees on the basis of judicial qualification and suitability for the position of Supreme Court justice, what Gibson and Caldeira refer to as \u22Judiciousness.\u22 This two part evaluation mirrors part of Abrahams\u27 model of executive decision making for Supreme Court nominations.Given that stealth nominees, herein defined as nominees with limited judicial records, by their nature provide little insight into their ideological beliefs, they do not provoke significant disapproval among the mass public on that basis. Provided they meet some minimum standard of judiciousness, approval of stealth nominees is not negatively affected by the lack of knowledge about the nominee\u27s ideology. Thus, in the cases examined herein presidents were able through the nomination of stealth candidates to avoid public disapproval their nominees to the Court.
机译:传统观点认为,美国公众对最高法院一无所知,因此,在有关最高法院候选人的确认性辩论中,以及作为政治动员工具的情况下,普通公民的意见都是无关紧要的。鉴于第十七修正案直接选举参议院和参议院的建议与同意角色,无论公众意见多么复杂,公众舆论都是相关的。此外,动员群众的公众认可或不赞成是总体上影响党派政治策略的一个因素。很明显,公众知道最高法院的提名人,他们根据两个不同的依据对提名人进行评估。首先,公众根据意识形态模型对被提名人进行评估,以达到公众拥有的关于被提名人意识形态的信息的程度。其次,公众根据司法资格和对最高法院法官职位的适合性来评估被提名人,吉布森和卡尔代拉称之为“司法性”。这两个部分的评估反映了亚伯拉罕斯行政决策模型的一部分。鉴于最高法院的提名:鉴于隐性提名人(此处定义为司法记录有限的提名人),就其性质而言,对他们的意识形态信仰知之甚少,因此他们不会在此基础上引起广大公众的强烈反对。只要他们符合一定的最低司法标准,对隐身被提名人的批准就不会因对被提名人的意识形态缺乏了解而受到负面影响。因此,在这里审查的案件中,总统通过提名隐性候选人而避免了公众对法院提名的不赞成。

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    Kelly, Daniel E.;

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  • 年度 2010
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