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Firm\u27s behavior in the presence of antidumping laws

机译:在存在反倾销法的情况下的坚定行为

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摘要

Dumping and antidumping are among the prominent issues in trade negotiations these days. All economists agree that any barrier to the free flow of goods among countries of the world is welfare reducing. However, the proponents of antidumping laws claim that these laws are not meant to limit free trade but to promote fair trade, and therefore, if the trade is fair in laissez-faire environments, which in this case implies that dumping does not occur in the absence of antidumping law, the introduction of antidumping laws should not matter;The definition of dumping commonly used in antidumping cases is that dumping is considered to have occurred if the price charged by a firm in a foreign market inclusive of transportation costs is lower than the price that firm charges for the same product in a domestic market. In these circumstances the antidumping law recommends that tariff, which is some proportion of the difference in the two prices, be imposed on the imports. We use best response curves in a simple duopoly model and analyze the effects of antidumping laws. We show that this type of tariff rule gives an edge to the home (importing) firm over the foreign (exporting) firm and creates non-concavity in the home firm\u27s profit function, and this causes jumps in its best response curve. While solving the model we show that multiple local solutions may exist due to the unique structure of the home firm\u27s best response curve. When solutions are hard to characterize analytically, we use numeric simulation. We simulate a situation where, in the absence of antidumping law, dumping does not take place in equilibrium. However, if the antidumping law is introduced in this situation, multiple solutions emerge some of which are in the regions where the law is actually binding for the foreign firm;Intuitively, one expects that the antidumping laws would not affect decisions of the firms in both importing and exporting countries if the dumping does not occur in laissez-faire situation. However, we demonstrate that the presence of antidumping laws can lead firms to modify their behavior.
机译:如今,倾销和反倾销是贸易谈判中的突出问题。所有经济学家都认为,阻碍世界各国之间商品自由流通的任何障碍都是在减少福利。但是,反倾销法的拥护者声称,这些法律的目的不是限制自由贸易,而是促进公平贸易,因此,如果贸易在自由放任的环境中是公平的,则在这种情况下意味着倾销不会发生在自由贸易中。如果没有反倾销法,反倾销法的出台就没关系;反倾销案件中常用的倾销定义是,如果公司在国外市场收取的价格(包括运输成本在内)低于价格,则认为已经发生了倾销。公司在国内市场上为同一产品收取的价格。在这种情况下,反倾销法建议对进口产品征收关税,这是两种价格差异的一部分。我们在简单的双寡头模型中使用最佳响应曲线,并分析反倾销法的影响。我们表明,这种关税规则使住宅(进口)企业比外国(出口)企业更具优势,并在住宅企业的利润函数中产生了非凹性,这导致其最佳响应曲线跳跃。在求解模型时,我们显示由于本地公司最佳响应曲线的独特结构,可能存在多个本地解决方案。当解决方案难以解析地表征时,我们使用数值模拟。我们模拟了一种情况,在没有反倾销法的情况下,倾销不会在均衡状态下进行。但是,如果在这种情况下引入反倾销法,则会有多种解决方案出现,其中一些是在该法对外国公司实际上具有约束力的区域内;直觉上,人们希望反倾销法不会影响到两家公司的决策。进口国和出口国,如果没有在放任的情况下发生倾销。但是,我们证明了反倾销法的存在可以导致企业改变其行为。

著录项

  • 作者

    Khan, Nadeem;

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  • 年度 1994
  • 总页数
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 en
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