Previous theoretical and empirical studies suggest that CEOs' political connections are valuable to firms. We examine whether such connections become entrenched if the expected political capital fails to materialize and the firm lacks other types of political power. Using a sample of listed non-SOEs in China, we show that politically connected CEOs have a lower probability of turnover and cause a weaker turnover-performance sensitivity than non-politically connected CEOs. Further analyses show that these turnover patterns are not consistent with alternative explanations, such as superior managerial ability, being a member of controlling families or being promoted from the inside. The turnover patterns are less pronounced in firms with alternative political power, such as connected boards or being vital to the local economy. Following the turnover of politically connected CEOs, firm performance does not necessarily undergo significant improvement. Our results call for new theories that comprehend the real effects of political connections.
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机译:用于啤酒的二次过滤的过滤材料及其生产方法技术领域本发明涉及一种用于包含硅藻土的啤酒的二次过滤的过滤材料及其制备方法,其中在与过滤的啤酒的流动相反的方向上,所述过滤材料为由第一层粗过滤硅藻土制成,其厚度大于2毫米,过滤面积的范围为0.66至1.05 kg / me2,第二层由混合物制成,厚度大于2毫米过滤面积为0.55至1.20 kg / me2的细过滤硅藻土和过滤面积为0.10至0.20 kg / me2的吸附材料,第三过滤层具有粗滤硅藻土和细滤硅藻土的重量比为10:90至30:70的混合物产生的厚度大于1.5mm。