Part I of this article discusses the Court\u27s opinions in Rust and Casey. It first demonstrates that the driving force in both decisions was the Court\u27s characterization of abortion counseling as an activity rather than as speech. Part I further discusses the speech/conduct distinction in First Amendment jurisprudence and demonstrates that abortion counseling falls on the speech side of that distinction. Parts II and III suggest that the real cause of the conflation of speech and conduct in Rust and Casey was the confluence of (1) the reemergence of reasoning found in a curious commercial speech decision -- Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company and (2) the Court\u27s rapidly changing view of a woman\u27s constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy.
展开▼
机译：本文的第一部分在Rust和Casey中讨论了法院的意见。它首先表明，这两个决定的推动力是法院将堕胎咨询定性为一项活动而不是言语。第一部分进一步讨论了《第一修正案》判例中的言语/行为区分，并证明了堕胎咨询属于该区分的言语方面。第二部分和第三部分表明，Rust和Casey中言语和行为相混淆的真正原因是（1）在一个奇怪的商业性言语判决中重新出现了推理-Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates诉旅游公司和（2）法院对妇女终止妊娠的宪法权利的看法日新月异。
展开▼
