This paper concerns one of the thorniest aspects in company law: the derivative action. As an exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, individual shareholders can, acting on behalf of a company, sue the company’s director if a wrong is done to the company. Private shareholders’ action has been a major landscape in corporate governance in the US, but not in the UK. (Armour et al, 2007) Recently, the law on derivative action has experienced significant changes with the codification adopted in many jurisdictions. It is doubtful as to whether derivative actions are a useful mechanism to enhance investor protection. Chinese companies have been widely conceived as having a blockholder model, in which the state as the controlling shareholder should in theory possess the incentives to constrain the opportunistic behavior of managers. Nonetheless, the state, as loosely defined as “people as a whole”, has failed to exercise any effective monitoring role. The introduction of the statutory derivative action in 2005 is a significant experiment to establish an investor-friendly legal regime. However, during the transplantation of western law into China, there are several fundamental problems that need to be properly dealt with so as to allow the derivative action to function effectively. The paper begins by examining the role of derivative actions in China, then reviews Chinese derivative action system with respect to substantive law and enforcement, and discusses the inadequacies of the present system such as costly litigation expenses and ambiguous procedures. Finally, a discussion for further reforms will inevitably include comparative references to other legal systems. The Chinese case has illustrated a paradigm shift of governance towards the role of private actors.
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机译:本文涉及公司法中最棘手的方面之一:衍生诉讼。作为Foss v。Harbottle案规则的一个例外,如果对公司做错了事,个人股东可以代表公司行事起诉公司董事。私人股东的行为一直是美国公司治理的主要内容,但在英国却不是。 (Armour et al,2007)最近,随着许多司法管辖区采用编纂法,衍生诉讼法发生了重大变化。衍生行动是否是增强投资者保护的有用机制,这令人怀疑。中国公司被广泛认为具有大股东模型,在这种模型中,作为控股股东的国家在理论上应具有约束经理人投机行为的动机。然而,被粗定义为“整体人民”的国家未能行使任何有效的监督作用。 2005年引入法定衍生诉讼是建立投资者友好型法律制度的一项重大实验。但是,在西方法律移植到中国的过程中,有一些基本问题需要适当处理,以使派生诉讼有效发挥作用。本文首先考察了衍生诉讼在中国的作用,然后回顾了实体诉讼和执法方面的中国衍生诉讼制度,并讨论了现行制度的不足之处,例如昂贵的诉讼费用和模棱两可的程序。最后,关于进一步改革的讨论将不可避免地包括对其他法律制度的比较性参考。中国的案例说明了治理模式向私人角色的转变。
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