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Joint Defense or Research Joint Venture? Reassessing the Patent-Challenge-Bloc\u27s Antitrust Status

机译:联合防御还是研究合资?重新评估专利挑战集团的反托拉斯地位

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摘要

A patent challenger who defeats a patent wins spoils that it must share with the world, including all its competitors. This forced sharing undercuts an alleged infringer\u27s incentive to stay in the fight to the finish - especially if the patent owner offers an attractive settlement. Too many settlements, and too few definitive patent challenges, are the result. I have argued previously that a litigation-stage bounty would help correct this tilt against patent challenges, for it would provide cash prizes to successful patent challengers that they alone would enjoy. Even the best-designed bounty, however, would likely fail to encourage patent validity challenges in all the cases where such encouragement would be salutary. Others have urged that, going forward, post-grant administrative review is a more promising approach to weeding out weak patents. A new post-grant review procedure, however, will do nothing to encourage worthy challenges to thousands of extant weak, overasserted patents.This article explores another litigation-stage approach to overcoming the free rider problem that undercuts patent validity challenges - namely, strong-form joint defense agreements among multiple accused infringers. Strong-form agreements, which go beyond light coordination and information sharing, have long been condemned as unlawful buyers\u27 cartels. The seminal case remains Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan. But current doctrine’s condemnation trades on a category mistake rooted in a fatally simplistic view that patents are commodity property (rather than what they are, which is probabilistic exclusion rights). Contrary to conventional wisdom, a binding commitment among accused infringers jointly to fund a full challenge to patent infringement allegations is not, nor is it akin to, a buyers’ cartel for buying commodities. Rather, it is a research joint venture, the goal of which is to generate valuable - but otherwise inappropriate - information about the patent\u27s true validity or scope.
机译:击败专利者的专利挑战者将赢得胜利,必须与世界分享,包括其所有竞争对手。这种强制共享削弱了被指控的侵权者继续坚持到底的动机,尤其是在专利所有人提供有吸引力的解决方案的情况下。结果是和解太多,最终的专利挑战也很少。之前我曾辩称,诉讼阶段的赏金将有助于纠正这种针对专利挑战的倾向,因为它将为成功的专利挑战者提供现金奖励,让他们独自享受。但是,即使设计得最好的赏金,在所有鼓励都是有益的情况下也可能不会鼓励专利有效性挑战。其他人则敦促今后,授予专利后的行政复审是清除弱专利的一种更有希望的方法。不过,新的授权后审查程序将无助于鼓励对成千上万的现存弱小,过分主张专利的挑战。本文探讨了另一种诉讼阶段的方法来克服阻碍专利有效性挑战的搭便车问题,即强势专利。在多个被告侵权者之间达成联合抗辩协议。长期以来,谴责形式广泛的协议超出了轻度协调和信息共享的范围,被视为非法买家。尚待审理的案件是Jones Knitting Corp.诉Morgan。但是,当前学说的谴责是基于一种类别错误,这种错误源于一种致命的过于简单化的观点,即专利是商品财产(而不是它们是什么,这是概率排除权)。与传统的看法相反,被告侵权者之间有约束力的承诺共同资助对专利侵权指控的全面挑战,这既不是,也不是类似于购买商品的买方卡特尔。相反,这是一家研究型合资企业,其目的是产生有关专利的真实有效性或范围的有价值的信息,但在其他方面则不合适。

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    Miller, Joseph S.;

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  • 年度 2011
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