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Cross-Employee Redistribution Effects of Mandated Employee Benefits

机译:强制性员工福利的跨员工再分配效应

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摘要

Whether mandated employee benefit policies are efficient, depends on the ratio of aggregate value attached by employees to the benefit, compared to the aggregate employer cost of providing the benefit. The higher the aggregate value/cost ratio is, the stronger is the justification for implementing the policy. High value/cost ratios are indicative of the existence of market failures in the voluntary provision of the benefit. Mandated benefits, efficient or not, do not entail employer-employee redistributive outcomes. The fact that no employment rate changes can be traced following the enforcement of a mandate program is usually indicative of full employer cost shifting. Policy makers treat the magnitude of cost shifting, as a proxy of the value workers place on the benefit, disregarding the fact that full cost shifting can also result from the inelasticity of labor supply. When inelasticity of labor supply is responsible for full shifting of the costs of the mandate, workers are simply carrying the dead weight cost of the mandate. From an intra-employee perspective, it seems that the public is mainly concerned whether mandates are increasing the unemployment rate. This is true of the minimum wage discourse and the discussions pertaining to the prospects of mandatory employer-provided health insurance. Again, it is assumed that if employment rates are unharmed, the mandate is efficient and equitable since employees are financing the cost of the benefit through decreased wages (health insurance) or increased productivity (minimum wage). The fact that employers do not respond to mandates by decreasing total demand for labor, does not out rule intra-employee redistribution. Mandated benefit schemes, similar to voluntary benefit schemes, reinforce dual labor market practices, in which exempt employees are financing to some extent the costs of providing the benefit to covered employees. This structure of cross-subsidy is efficient from the employer\u27s perspective. It raises productivity and commitment on the part of internal workers. However, it increases compensation disparity between internal and external labor market employees
机译:强制性员工福利政策是否有效,取决于员工对福利附加的总价值与提供福利的雇主总成本之比。总价值成本比越高,实施该政策的理由就越强。高价值/成本比表明自愿提供福利时存在市场失灵。强制性福利,无论是否有效,都不会导致雇主-雇员的重新分配结果。强制执行任务计划后无法找到就业率变化的事实通常表明雇主已全额转移了成本。决策者将成本转移的幅度视为价值工人代表利益的代名词,而忽略了完全成本转移也可能源于劳动力供应的缺乏弹性这一事实。当劳动力供应的缺乏弹性导致任务成本全部转移时,工人仅承担任务成本。从内部雇员的角度来看,似乎公众主要担心强制性命令是否会增加失业率。最低工资的讨论和有关强制性雇主提供的健康保险前景的讨论都是如此。同样,假设如果就业率不受损害,则任务授权是有效且公平的,因为员工通过降低工资(健康保险)或提高生产率(最低工资)来筹集福利成本。雇主不通过减少对劳动力的总需求来响应任务授权这一事实,并不排除员工内部重新分配的可能性。强制性福利计划类似于自愿性福利计划,加强了双重劳动力市场惯例,在这种惯例中,免税员工在某种程度上筹集了向受保员工提供福利的成本。从雇主的角度来看,这种交叉补贴的结构是有效的。它提高了内部工人的生产率和承诺感。但是,它增加了内部和外部劳动力市场雇员之间的薪酬差距

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    Rabin-Margalioth, Sharon;

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  • 年度 2003
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