In this paper I argue against Armstrong’s recent truthmaking account of possibility. I show that the truthmaking account presupposes modality in a number of different ways, and consequently that it is incapable of underwriting a genuine reduction of modality. I also argue that Armstrong’s account faces serious difficulties irrespective of the question of reduction; in particular, I argue that his Entailment and Possibility Principles are both false.\ud\udKeywords: Armstrong - Truthmakers - Possibility - Reduction - Instantiation - Combinatorialism
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机译：在本文中，我反对阿姆斯特朗最近对真理的可能性的解释。我表明，以事实为依据的帐户以许多不同的方式预设了情态，因此，它不能承保真正减少情态。我还争辩说，不管削减问题如何，阿姆斯特朗的帐户都面临着严重的困难；特别是，我认为他的“包含性和可能性原则”都是错误的。\ ud \ ud关键字：阿姆斯特朗-真理创造者-可能性-还原-实例化-组合主义
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