The Federal Advisory Committee Act\u27s requirement that advisory committees be \u22fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed\u22 is generally considered either nonjusticiable under the Administrative Procedure Act or justiciable but subject to highly deferential review. These approaches stem from courts\u27 purported inability to discern from the text of the statute any meaningful legal standards for policing representational balance. Thus, the Federal Advisory Committee Act\u27s most important substantive limitation on institutional pathologies such as committee \u22capture\u22 or domination is generally unused despite the ubiquity of federal advisory committees in the modern regulatory state. This Note argues for a new reading of the Federal Advisory Committee Act\u27s fair balance provision that would make the provision justiciable. Instead of reading the provision to require quantitative representational balancing of various interests-and thus asking courts to make political decisions-this Note contends that the text of the provision permits an alternative reading, which I call the \u22deliberative process\u22 reading. Under this reading, courts would decide whether a committee\u27s record airs all of the relevant viewpoints associated with the issue under the committee\u27s consideration. This kind of review is familiar to courts in other administrative law contexts, so there would be no plausible argument that the provision is unreviewable for lack of meaningful standards. I argue that this deliberative process reading would enhance advisory outputs and ensure that this \u22fifth branch\u22 of government is still under public control.
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