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Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets: a test for ex ante moral hazard revisited

机译:保险市场信息不对称测试:重新审视事前道德风险测试

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摘要

The disentanglement of adverse selection from ex ante moral hazard remains an empirical challenge. Our comment dissects a natural experiment proposed by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) to test for ex ante moral hazard. Firstly, we argue that their test, as proposed, is too simple and too general to enable reliable inferences about the existence of ex ante moral hazard to be drawn and the reported negative coefficient does not rule out moral hazard. Secondly, their analysis strongly suggests that their proposed instrument (inherited bonus malus) is endogenously determined and therefore does not satisfy the technical requirements of a natural experiment.
机译:逆向选择与先验道德风险脱节仍然是一个经验挑战。我们的评论剖析了Chiappori和Salanié(2000)提出的自然实验,以测试事前的道德风险。首先,我们认为,他们提出的检验过于简单和笼统,无法可靠地推断出事前道德风险的存在,而且所报告的负系数也不能排除道德风险。其次,他们的分析强烈表明,他们提出的工具(继承的红花苹果)是内生确定的,因此不能满足自然实验的技术要求。

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