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Information rules the game : information exchange as a success factor in internal succession in family businesses

机译:信息主导游戏:信息交换是家族企业内部继承的成功因素

摘要

Succession is a crucial moment in the life cycle of a family business. An effective succession requires taking a step-by-step approach, including structured planning, selection, and integration of the successor. Family firms behave differently than non-family firms due to risk aversity and the mixture of family and business logics. The overall purpose of this dissertation is to gain a deeper understanding of the role of information exchange in business succession. The succession process is examined from different angles, focusing on the broad individual perspectives of the predecessor and the successor.In family firms, potential successors enter the pool of candidates at birth. Various observable criteria are important when making the final selection. Despite the long time frame of the succession process, information asymmetries can arise because it is not always fully clear if the chosen candidate is willing to succeed the incumbent. This variable also influences the choice of selection criteria, which differ in nature. For example, existing social capital, which can influence the sustainability of succession, can be a selection criterion. An unstructured social capital transfer can, for instance, undermine the sustainability of success due to the ineffective usage of long-term network contacts. This situation is an example of how information asymmetries affect the overall business succession process and what types of information are exchanged during the process.The empirical studies in this dissertation shed light on the role of information in the succession process and the behavior of family business members who deal with the information. The empirical results of the first study show that information asymmetries in family firms change over time as firms develop their own processes to promote information exchange and handle the challenges resulting from information asymmetries. In the second empirical study, signaling is offered as an explanation. Successors send signals, for example, through choosing an education which fits to the family business. This behavior is evaluated as a signal. In family firms, signaling takes place to identify the candidate who best fits the firm. This research also shows that family firms develop their own processes to identify potential candidates, organize educational programs and integrate candidates in a step-by-step approach to ensure sustainable success. These two empirical studies highlight the long-term orientation of family firms, the opportunity for potential candidates to implement new ideas, and the importance of knowledge about successors’ attributes, particularly their risk level and innovativeness. These studies show that family firms which develop their own processes are more professional than previously thought. They identify and screen candidates according to business needs and optimize the process of information exchange. The third empirical study focuses specifically on information about network contacts. The transfer of social capital during the business succession process is analyzed from the perspective of social capital theory. This study shows that network contacts are transferred during the succession process, and the successor adds personal social capital to the network, including various opportunities to use the succession situation to renew the existing network.The understanding of business succession as a time for renewal and of succession as an entrepreneurial process localizes this dissertation in the fields of family business and business succession in family firms from a principal agent perspective. Additionally, signaling theory and social capital theory are used to analyze how family businesses handle the principal agent situation between the incumbent and successor(s). Thus, this dissertation improves understanding of business succession from the principal agent perspective and synthesizes research and practice to emphasize the importance of every step of succession. A discussion of the findings and the implications for research and practice conclude this dissertation. This research raises family business owners’ awareness of information asymmetries and blind spots among family members. Information exchange and clearly structured transfers of knowledge and network contacts offer successors scope for decision-making and development, which help family firms making business succession a time for renewal instead of a time of struggle.
机译:继承是家族企业生命周期中的关键时刻。有效的继任者需要采取逐步的方法,包括对继任者进行结构化的计划,选择和集成。由于风险规避以及家族和商业逻辑的混合,家族企业的行为与非家族企业不同。本文的总体目的是为了更深入地了解信息交换在业务继承中的作用。从不同角度考察了继承过程,着眼于前任和继任者的广泛个人观点。在家族企业中,潜在的继任者在出生时就进入了候选人的宝库。进行最终选择时,各种可观察的标准都很重要。尽管继任过程的时限很长,但仍可能会出现信息不对称现象,因为并不总是很清楚所选择的候选人是否愿意接任现任。此变量还影响选择标准的选择,这些选择标准的性质不同。例如,可以影响继承可持续性的现有社会资本可以作为选择标准。例如,由于长期网络联系的无效使用,无组​​织的社会资本转移会破坏成功的可持续性。这种情况说明了信息不对称如何影响整个业务继承过程,以及在此过程中交换了哪些类型的信息。本论文的实证研究阐明了信息在继承过程中的作用以及家族企业成员的行为。谁处理信息。第一项研究的实证结果表明,家族企业中的信息不对称会随着时间的流逝而变化,因为企业发展了自己的流程来促进信息交流并应对信息不对称带来的挑战。在第二项实证研究中,提供信号作为解释。继任者例如通过选择适合家族企业的教育来发出信号。此行为被评估为信号。在家族企业中,通过信号传递来确定最适合该企业的候选人。这项研究还表明,家族企业会逐步开发自己的流程,以识别潜在候选人,组织教育计划并以逐步的方式整合候选人,以确保可持续的成功。这两项实证研究强调了家族企业的长期发展方向,潜在候选人实施新想法的机会以及有关继任者属性(尤其是其风险水平和创新性)知识的重要性。这些研究表明,发展自己的流程的家族企业比以前认为的更加专业。他们根据业务需求识别和筛选候选人,并优化信息交换过程。第三项实证研究专门针对网络联系信息。从社会资本理论的角度分析了企业继任过程中的社会资本转移。这项研究表明,网络联系是在继任过程中转移的,继任者为网络增加了个人的社会资本,包括利用继任情况更新现有网络的各种机会。从委托代理的角度来看,继承是一种创业过程,将本论文定位于家族企业和家族企业中的企业继承领域。此外,使用信号理论和社会资本理论来分析家族企业如何处理在任者和继任者之间的委托人状况。因此,本论文从委托代理的角度增进了对业务继承的理解,并综合研究和实践以强调每个继承步骤的重要性。对研究结果的讨论以及对研究和实践的意义进行了总结。这项研究提高了家族企业所有者对家庭成员之间信息不对称和盲点的认识。信息交换以及结构清晰的知识和网络联系的转移为继任者提供了决策和发展的空间,这有助于家族企业将业务继承作为更新的时间,而不是艰难的时光。

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    Schell Sabrina;

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  • 年度 2016
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  • 正文语种 eng
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