Crítica da razão do Estado: uma (re)formulação do conceito de interesse público e a correlata construção de um Estado meritocrático de direito

摘要

The present work aims to critically investigate the possibility of performing an epistemology of Public Law from the concept of public interest. This purpose indicates an attempt to solve the problem about the claim to universality of this concept, the very formulation of the concept – understanding the relationship between public interest and private interests from it –, as well as the consequences of this formulation for the administrative practice. The resolution of these problems, as here advocated, involves five steps (which are revealed as secondary objectives, each one developing one derived thesis): i) the displacement of the supremacy problem to the concept problem; ii) the use of transcendental methodology (the question of the concept possibility) as a starting point; iii) the task of conceptualization; iv) the demonstration of an important implication for the proposed concept; v) the presentation of “normative” criteria related to this implication. Given these objectives, primary and secondary, our research plan is divided into three parts. The first two are analytical, and seek to demonstrate the “state of the art” of our researched subject. We chose to divide this subject in common good (first part) and public interest (second part) understanding these terms are ontologically identical, but methodologically distinct (doctrine uses to divide them, dealing with common good at the level of Political Science and with public interest at the level of Public Law). These first two parts therefore seek to put order to a given knowledge, that is, explain what can be said in the dogmatic study as its “logic of truth” (a truth presumed on that dogmatic). The third part is dialectical, and there are found our thesis key considerations, considering the proposed objectives. The aim is to put that given knowledge into motion, trying to discover something a priori, that is, broadening the knowledge of the researched object beyond experience. At this point, the analytical approach showed itself insufficient, reason of the switch into a dialectical approach, in order to achieve that epistemology of Public Law. This resulted in: understanding public interest as a synthetic judgment a priori of Public Law; (re) formulating the concept based on two necessary elements (one legal and another humanistic); and, finally, constructing a Meritocratic Rule of Law, related to that reformulation, which acts (must act) through public policies of merit, explained by their commandments.