Darwinian epistemology : assessing the implications for reliable cognition in a non-adaptive domain of belief

摘要

Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace departed ways on the implications of evolution for human cognition. While Darwin argued that natural selection affected both the reliability and unreliability of human cognitive faculties, Wallace rejected the idea that natural selection could explain higher order intelligence. If Wallace is right, then Darwinian epistemology seems implausible. However, I argue that this position is false. In Chapter 1 I survey a history of Darwinian epistemology. In Chapter 2 I examine the Scope Objection to Darwinian epistemology: that evolution did not supply us with the natural cognitive capacities for achieving non-adaptive true beliefs. In Chapter 3 I respond to the Scope Objection by assessing Robert McCauley’s theory of natural cognition. In Chapter 4 I evaluate two difficulties with my response to the Scope Objection. I conclude that evolution is sufficient for explaining the reliability of human cognitive faculties in non-adaptive domains of belief.