首页> 外文OA文献 >On Cost Allocation in Networks with Threshold Based Discounting
【2h】

On Cost Allocation in Networks with Threshold Based Discounting

机译:基于阈值折扣的网络成本分配

代理获取
本网站仅为用户提供外文OA文献查询和代理获取服务,本网站没有原文。下单后我们将采用程序或人工为您竭诚获取高质量的原文,但由于OA文献来源多样且变更频繁,仍可能出现获取不到、文献不完整或与标题不符等情况,如果获取不到我们将提供退款服务。请知悉。

摘要

We study network design in which each pair of nodes can communicate via a direct link and the communication flow can be delivered through any path in the network. The cost of flow through each link is discounted if and only if the amount of flow exceeds certain threshold. This exploitation of economies of scale encourages the concentration of flows and use of relatively small number of links. Applications include telecommunications, airline traffic flow, and mail delivery networks. The cost of services delivered through such a network is distributed among its users who may be individuals or organizations with possibly conflicting interests. The cooperation between these users is essential for the exploitation of economies of scale. Consequently, there is a need to ensure a fair distribution of the cost of providing the service among network users. In order to describe this cost allocation problem we formulate the associated cooperative game, to be referred to as the threshold game. We then demonstrate that certain cost allocation solution (the core of the threshold game) can be efficiently applied to relatively ’large’ networks with threshold-based discounting.
机译:我们研究网络设计,其中每对节点都可以通过直接链接进行通信,并且通信流可以通过网络中的任何路径传递。当且仅当流量超过特定阈值时,才打折通过每个链接的流量成本。规模经济的这种利用鼓励流量的集中和使用相对少量的链接。应用程序包括电信,航空公司流量和邮件传递网络。通过这种网络交付的服务成本在其用户之间分配,这些用户可能是利益冲突的个人或组织。这些用户之间的合作对于利用规模经济至关重要。因此,需要确保在网络用户之间公平地分配提供服务的成本。为了描述此成本分配问题,我们制定了相关的合作博弈,称为阈值博弈。然后,我们证明了某些成本分配解决方案(阈值游戏的核心)可以通过基于阈值的折扣有效地应用于相对较大的网络。

著录项

  • 作者

    Skorin-Kapov, Darko;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 2000
  • 总页数
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
代理获取

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号